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10.1  Introduction 
Korea has a particular form of bank-enterprise relationship that links each 
large business group to a particular bank (the principal transactions bank) in 
the context of the credit control system. The major functions of principal trans- 
actions banks include monitoring and reporting to the Office of Bank Supervi- 
sion and Examination the financial situation and investment activities of the 
corporations, as well as implementing government credit control over the cor- 
porate sector. 
The nature of credit control has changed, reflecting the emerging challenges 
faced by the Korean economy. The system was first utilized to encourage large 
corporations to finance their growth through the stock market. In the 1980s it 
was used as a means to ease the concentration of economic power by curbing 
real  estate  acquisitions  and  debt-financed business  diversification. Despite 
such changes in the goals pursued, the credit control system remains a regula- 
tory framework to bolster the government’s control over the corporate sector. 
It is far from being an autonomous bank-customer relationship. 
However, in the process of  opening up the Korean economy, which calls 
for immense restructuring efforts on the part of  corporations, there has been 
increasing concern that the credit control system poses a serious impediment 
to the structural adjustment of the economy. As such, the principal transactions 
bank system must be transformed into a normal bank-customer relationship 
rather than be allowed to retain its regulatory role of  controlling large busi- 
ness groups. 
This paper describes the role of  the principal transactions bank system in 
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Korea and evaluates the costs that  accompany  such a system. Section  10.2 
examines the evolution of the principal transactions bank system in accordance 
with the shifts in the government’s development objectives. Section 10.3 re- 
views the structure of the present system, which will be followed by a perfor- 
mance evaluation in section 10.4. Section 10.5 will discuss the issues involved 
in developing a desirable bank-client relationship in Korea with emphasis on 
comparing Korea’s principal transactions bank system with the Japanese main 
bank system. 
10.2  Evolution of the Principal Transactions Bank System 
The role of financial institutions as mobilizers of savings in Korea was rec- 
ognized by the government only after the interest rate reform  in September 
1965 which contributed significantly to the deepening of the financial market. 
The military coup in the early 1960s led to the nationalization of commercial 
banks, and a number of new financial institutions were established in the 1960s 
to perform  specialized  activities, such as financing small and medium-sized 
firms and housing and foreign exchange business. 
Throughout the 1970s, the Korean financial system was subject to increasing 
repression  with  rigid  interest rate controls despite accelerating  inflation  and 
extensive government intervention in credit allocation. Consequently, financial 
development was rather slow. However, with the Presidential Emergency De- 
cree in 1972, which froze the unorganized curb loan market, short-term finance 
companies and mutual savings and finance companies were established, con- 
tributing to the diversification of Korea’s financial market. The capital market 
also has grown rapidly since 1972 as the result of strong promotional measures 
by the government. 
Promotion of the heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s by way of pro- 
viding subsidized bank  loans to these industries created several side effects: 
inefficient investment allocation, weak capital structure of large corporations, 
limited access of small and medium-sized firms to bank credit, concentration 
of economic power, and managerial inefficiency of banks. 
This experience of excessive government intervention in resource allocation 
and its serious consequences gave rise to the need for financial liberalization 
in the early  1980s. The liberalization  effort started with the lifting of  many 
restrictions on bank management and the lowering of entry barriers to various 
financial services in order to promote competition and efficiency. In addition, 
the government divested its equity shares in all nationwide commercial banks. 
Most preferential interest rates applied to various policy loans were abolished 
and more recently interest rates have been partially deregulated.’ 
I. “Policy loans” are loosely defined as those provided at preferential interest rates or earmarked 
for specific sectors or industries. Such loans include export financing, the National Investment 
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Korea’s principal transactions bank system started as part of a credit control 
system on business  groups. The evolution  of  the credit control system must 
first be analyzed in order to understand the principal transactions bank system 
because the role of the principal transactions banks and their relationship with 
the corporate  sector were defined  within  the structure of  the  credit control 
system. 
10.2.1  Introduction of Credit Control and the Principal Transactions 
Bank System 
The principal transactions bank and credit control systems were introduced 
in 1974 with a view to improving the capital structure of large corporations by 
encouraging direct financing through public offerings of equity shares while 
holding down borrowing from financial institutions. 
The sharp increase in bank lending after the interest rate reform in 1965 and 
the  large-scale, though tightly  controlled,  introduction of  foreign capital in 
1966 resulted in excessive dependence on borrowing and insolvency for many 
corporations despite rapid economic growth. Because of domestic bank guar- 
antees on foreign borrowing, defaulted foreign loans were turned into loans by 
domestic banks.  Between  1965 and  1970, the equity ratio of  manufacturing 
firms showed a significant decline from 51.6 to 23.3 percent. The Korean gov- 
ernment undertook the restructuring of insolvent companies between 1969 and 
1971 and the  Presidential Emergency Decree  of  1972 attempted to address 
fundamentally the problem of Korea’s worsening  corporate capital structure 
and excessive financial burden. The government adopted a credit control sys- 
tem as an institutional tool to promote the sound capital structure of corpora- 
tions. Together with replacing short-term bank loans with long-term loans, the 
decree required all curb loans outstanding to be reported to the National Tax 
Administration; most of these loans were either rescheduled to be repaid over 
several years at low interest rates or converted into equity capital. 
Under the administrative guidance of the government,  for the purpose of 
implementing the credit control system, banks agreed to designate the bank 
with which the principal company of a business group (whose total credit from 
banking institutions exceeded a certain amount) had major business relation- 
ships as the principal transactions bank for all the member companies of that 
group. The main functions of a principal transactions bank included reviewing 
and monitoring its client corporations’ plans for improving their capital struc- 
ture, setting credit ceilings for operating capital, and providing business infor- 
mation and managerial guidance to client corporations. When  nonprincipal 
firms, housing, agriculture, and fisheries, loans in foreign currency, credit to the Korea Develop- 
ment Bank (KDB) and the Korea Export Import (EXIM) Bank, and special loans for facility in- 
vestment. In recent years, export financing and loans to specific industries have been phased out 
significantly, even though credit from deposit money banks to the KDB and EXIM Bank as well 
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banks extended new credit to a corporation, they had to consult with the corpo- 
ration’s principal transactions bank. 
10.2.2  Evolution of the Credit Control System 
A noteworthy change in the credit control system in the early 1980s was the 
shift in the central objective of the system from the improvement of corporate 
capital structure to the restriction of real estate acquisitions and investment in 
other companies. This shift was geared to support the September 27 Measure 
of  1980, which was undertaken with a view to reinforcing corporate competi- 
tiveness by checking business expansion financed by debt. In the early 1980s, 
Korean companies suffered from a severe recession caused by the second oil 
shock as well as political and social unrest following the assassination of Presi- 
dent Park. The government seems to have believed that the weakening interna- 
tional competitiveness of Korean companies was fundamentally attributable to 
their imprudent investment behavior, such as real estate acquisitions and ill- 
planned business expansion into new industries. The September 27 Measure 
forced business firms to repay their borrowing from banking institutions by 
selling their nonoperating real estate as well as the real estate held by business 
owners and managers, while coercing 26 business groups with too many mem- 
ber companies or weak capital structure to dispose of some of  their member 
companies.2 
Meanwhile,  the  credit  control  system,  based  on  the  assumed  collusion 
among banking institutions, was found to be illegal under the Monopoly Regu- 
lation and Fair Trade Act. For this reason, the system was reformed into an 
official regulatory  system following the revision  of the General Banking Act 
at the end of  1982. The act states that the Monetary Board may restrict, by 
fixing ceilings, the aggregate volume of outstanding loans, guarantees, or as- 
sumptions of obligations of a banking institution for any individual business 
group. 
The credit control system has undergone significant changes in its objectives 
and characteristics since 1984, reflecting the progress in financial liberalization 
as well as political and social changes. These changes resulted in concentration 
of  credit control mainly  on the 30 largest business groups while control on 
other corporations eased. 
The credit control system was reformed for three reasons. First, by the early 
1980s, an excessive number of groups and companies were subject to credit 
control  (table  10.1). In addition, since the amount of available credit for a 
company was decided on the basis of  its past credit requirements, small but 
2. As a result of  the September 27  Measure, 309.9 billion won  (2.7 percent of  the broadly 
defined money supply) of borrowing from banking institutions was repaid by  selling real estate, 
and 166 member companies of large business groups were severed from their groups by the end 
of 1984. Of the real estate that was sold, 56 percent (in terms of value) was purchased by individu- 
als and companies not subject to credit control, and the reg was sold to the Land Development 
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Table 10.1  Number of Corporations Subject to Credit Control 
End  March  End  End  October  June  March 
Corporate Type  1984  1985  1987  1988  1989  1991  1993 
Business groups  161  63  SO  50  48  SO  30 
Member corporations  1,459  696  807  845  913  -  1,014 
Companies not belonging to 
business groups  280  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Source: Office of Bank Supervision and Examination (1992). 
Notes: Criteria for selecting corporations to be subject to credit control: 
July  1984: (I) Business groups which have more than 20 billion won in total credit (loans plus 
payment guarantees)  from banks and  their member corporations. (2) Corporations that do not 
belong to a business group but that have more than 10 billion won in total credit or more than S 
billion won of loans. 
March 1985: Business groups that have more than 100 billion won in total credit and their mem- 
ber corporations. 
January 1987: Business groups that have more than IS0 billion won in total credit and their mem- 
her corporations. 
June 1991: The SO largest business groups selected on the basis of loans from banking institutions 
(excluding loans of major corporations) and their member corporations. 
February 1993: The 30 largest business groups selected on the basis of loans from banking institu- 
tions (excluding loans of major corporations) and their member corporations. 
quickly growing companies were in dire need of credit. In order to correct such 
inefficiencies, the number of business groups subjected to credit control was 
reduced, and basket credit control was adopted which regulated the share of 
large business groups in the total credit of banking institutions. 
Second, the extensive nature of credit control hampered the credit evaluation 
capability of banking institutions and unduly limited corporate activities. Thus, 
with the progress in financial liberalization during the 1980s, the major empha- 
sis of the credit control system was placed on discouraging real estate acquisi- 
tion and investment in other companies. 
Third, the objective of easing the concentration of economic power and pro- 
moting fair access to bank credit gained importance in the credit control sys- 
tem. The government seemed to believe that promoting economic development 
by depending heavily on large business corporations might no longer be effi- 
cient. At the same time, people became more concerned about allocative equity 
and more critical of large corporations after the democratic reform in 1987. As 
a result, the credit control  system assumed a rather complicated nature, re- 
flecting certain political and social considerations. Consequently, a strong bas- 
ket control system was adopted in 1988, which led to a steady reduction of the 
shares of the 5 largest and 30 largest business groups in total bank credit. 
Finally, credit control also played an important role in monetary manage- 
ment because the monetary expansion caused by the foreign sector was enor- 
mous as a result of the large current account surpluses between 1986 and 1989. 
As exports stagnated and the current account returned to deficit in  1990, 282  Sang-Woo Nam 
there was renewed concern about the growth potential of the economy as well 
as about the international competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. In this 
connection, the credit control system was criticized for impeding the capability 
of corporations to respond flexibly to the changing economic environment and 
to strengthen their competitiveness. 
As a result, the tight credit regulations of the 1980s began to be relaxed in 
199  1. The criterion for selecting business groups subject to credit control was 
changed from those with total bank credit of more than 150 billion won to the 
50 largest borrowers from banking institutions. This criteria was further re- 
laxed in 1993 to the 30 largest business groups. Also, to encourage specializa- 
tion, each of the 30 largest business groups was allowed to select, from among 
its member companies, up to three “Major Corporations,” to be exempt from 
credit control. 
10.3  Structure of the Current Principal Transactions Bank System 
10.3.1  Basket Credit Control on Business Groups 
Control of bank credit in Korea started as an integral part of monetary (M2) 
targeting. By setting a ceiling on the share of large business groups in banks’ 
total credit, the government has tried to ensure credit availability for small and 
medium-sized enterprises under a given M2 growth target.  Currently, credit 
control is imposed on the 30 largest business groups selected annually by the 
Office of Bank Supervision and Examination on the basis of the average end- 
of-month outstanding borrowings from banking institutions in the previous 
year. The Office of Bank Supervision and Examination sets a ceiling on the 
share of the business groups that are subject to basket control in each banking 
institution’s total  loans. A bank  should not let the collective shares of  the 5 
largest and the 30 largest business groups in its total loans exceed the levels 
set by the ~ffice.~  However, the office does not set ceilings on individual busi- 
ness groups. Loans to Major Corporations and “Corporations with Highly Dis- 
persed Ownership” are exempt from basket control. Loans extended by over- 
seas branches and postshipment export financing are also exempt. 
10.3.2  Selection of  the Principal Transactions Banks 
The principal transactions bank system applies only to corporations that are 
subject to credit control as designated by the Office of Bank Supervision and 
Examination. The bank  with  which the principal  corporation  of  a business 
group has major business usually becomes the principal transactions bank for 
3. E.g., the credit ceilings for the 5 largest and the 30 largest business groups in  1991 were 5.8 
and 10.8  I  percent of total bank loans. The actual shares of the 5 largest and the 30 largest business 
groups at the end of  1991 were 5.44 and 9.81 percent. Loans from nonbank financial intermediar- 
ies and the issuance of bank-guaranteed corporate bonds are not subject to such ceilings. 283  The Search for a New Bank-Business Relationship in Korea 
all the member firms of the group.4 Although any banking institution is eligi- 
ble, only the five major nationwide commercial banks and the Korea Exchange 
Bank have been selected as principal transactions banks for the 30 largest busi- 
ness groups (table 10.2). Corporations try to meet their financing requirements 
through their principal transactions bank as much as possible before they ap- 
proach other banks. Therefore, the principal transactions banks are better posi- 
tioned than other banks to earn fee income. However, principal transactions 
banks sometimes lend as much to other business groups of comparable size. 
When necessary, the Office of Bank Supervision and Examination can change 
a business group’s principal transactions bank, and business groups can also 
ask for a change, though this has rarely happened in the past. 
10.3.3 
Handling of  Information about Credit and Business Activities of 
Corporations 
The principal transactions bank supervises the overall credit situations of its 
client corporations, including local financing by  their overseas offices. Infor- 
mation about the client corporations collected by nonprincipal banks is sup- 
posed to be transmitted to the principal transactions bank. 
In reality, principal transactions banks obtain this information from the com- 
puter network of  banking institutions in which data concerning corporations 
with more than 2 billion won in bank loans are stored with a separate code for 
each company. However, as information about most nonbank loans is not en- 
tered into this network, a clear financing picture of a client group is available 
only from the report of the group. 
Provision of Loans 
The principal transactions bank sometimes takes the initiative, with or with- 
out government intervention, to organize a loan consortium when large-scale 
loans and guarantees (such as those related to overseas construction projects) 
are to be provided to its client group. In this case, the principal transactions 
bank monitors overall performance of the project and corporation on behalf of 
other participating banks. However, the fact that principal transactions banks’ 
credit supply to their client corporations is typically inadequate limits the in- 
fluence of the principal transactions banks over their clients. 
Each year principal transactions banks require their client corporations to 
submit their annual investment and financing plans. A favorable evaluation of 
the investment plan, however, does not necessarily lead to the bank’s financing 
of the major portion of its client’s needs. Likewise, even if a principal transac- 
tions bank objects to the investment plan, the corporation may continue with 
Role of the Principal Transactions Banks 
4. The principal corporation is chosen by  the Bank Supervisory Board in consideration of  the 
company’s position in the group, which depends on asset size and influence on other companies. Table 10.2  Status of the 30 Largest Business Groups (end of  1991) 
Number of  Number of  Share in 
Companies  Companies  Principal 
Sales  Debt/  Subject to  Satisfying  Principal  Transactions 
(billion  Equity  Credit  Guided Capital  Transactions  Bank's 
Business Group  won)  (%)  Control  Ratio  Bank  Equity 
1.  Samsung 
2.  Daewoo 
3.  Hyundai 
4.  Hanjin 
5.  Lucky-Goldstar 
6.  Sunkyung 
7.  Kia 
8.  Hanil 
9.  Ssangyoung 
10. Kumho 
I I. Korea Explosives 
12.  Daelim 
13. Doosan 
14.  Hyosung 
15.  Kukdong Oil 
Refining 
16.  Dongkuk Steel 
17.  Lotte 
18.  Halla 
19.  Kohap 
20.  Dongbu 





22.  Dong-Ah 
23.  Kolon 
24.  Sammi 
25.  Byucksan 
26.  Samyang Co. 
27.  Jinro 
28. Oriental 
Chemical 































































49  27 
19  9 
38  19 
17  7 
53  17 
29  17 
8  3 
12  5 
20  II 
25  12 
21  8 
12  7 
23  10 
14  7 
4  I 
I1  4 
29  12 
9  3 
7  3 
7  0 
6  4 
13  5 
20  II 
15  6 
15  4 
5  3 
19  5 
9  6 
8  1 































Source: Office of  Bank Supervision and Examination (1992). 
"Holdings of  Sumsung Insurance Co. 
"Holdings  of Lucky Securities and Lucky Fire and Marine Insurance Co. 
'Holdings of Ssangyoung Cement Co. 
dHoldings of  Daelim Industries. 
cHoldings of Dongkuk Steel Mill. 
'Holdings of  Samyang Co. 285  The Search for a New Bank-Business Relationship in  Korea 
its plan in many cases. In practice, the KDB exerts the most influence on corpo- 
rations’ investment plans (even though it does not serve as a principal transac- 
tions bank for any business group), as it provides most of the large, long-term 
funds for facility investment. In tight credit situations, with corporations badly 
in need of working capital, the opinion of the principal transactions banks has 
more impact on the corporations. 
Guidance  for the Improvement of  Corporate Capital Structure 
The principal transactions bank provides guidance on external financing and 
its uses to client corporations, urging them to improve their capital structure 
on the basis of the “guided equity ratio” set by the Office of Bank Supervision 
and Examination for each industry. If necessary, principal transactions banks 
must take appropriate measures, such as restricting new credit and urging re- 
payment of loans by corporations not in compliance through the selling of their 
holdings of securities or real estate. More specifically, business groups are put 
under special management guidance when their equity ratio, calculated semi- 
annually, declines more than 30 percent from the end of  the previous year to 
below the guided ratio or when the equity ratio falls short of 70 percent of the 
guided ratio. 
However, the principal  transactions banks’  leverage in corporate manage- 
ment guidance is usually weak because of  their limited capacity to meet the 
credit demands of client corporations under the chronic excess demand condi- 
tions in the market. As shown in table 10.2, only 227 (43 percent) of the 523 
companies under credit control satisfied the guided equity ratio at the end of 
199  1,  indicating that principal transactions banks’ guidance for the improve- 
ment of corporate capital structure was not very effective. 
Dealing with Troubled Firms 
When large corporate borrowers are in financial difficulty, the creditor banks 
usually play only a minor role in deciding whether  these companies will be 
bailed out. Restructuring or liquidation of a large corporation could cause suc- 
cessive bankruptcies of other companies that have business relationships with 
this corporation and, as a result, threaten the employment stability of the econ- 
omy. In addition, bankruptcies of large corporations could have a serious im- 
pact on the credibility of Korean companies and banks in international finan- 
cial and export markets. Therefore, decisions concerning the restructuring of 
large corporations are usually made at the government level (with the Industrial 
Policy  Deliberation  Committee  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance playing  major 
roles), and the principal transactions banks simply carry out the restructuring 
plan. 
During 1986-88,  for instance, as many as 78 corporations, largely selected 
by the Ministry of Finance, were involved in restructuring. Among the 78 cor- 
porations, 2 1 were restructured as a supplementary measure to earlier restruc- 
turing of shipping and overseas construction industries (table 10.3). Most of 286  Sang-Woo Nam 
Table 10.3  Financial Assistance to the 78 Restructured Corporations 
(trillion won) 
Assistance 
~  ~~~  ~ 
Shipping  Overseas 
Industry  Construction 
Rationalization  Rationalization  Other  Total 
Grace period for principal 
Long-term loans with 
Send money: loans for loss 
repayment  0.8  0.5  0.4  1.6 
interest subsidy  -  -  4.2  4.2 
compensation  -  -  0.5  0.5 
Write-off of principal  I .o  I .o 
Total assistance (principal)  0.8  0.5  6.0  7.3 
-  - 
Total credit from financial 
institutions  1.8  1.1  6.8  9.8 
Source: Office of Bank Supervision and Examination, internal data. 
the remaining 57 companies were formally designated targets for rationaliza- 
tion by the Industrial Policy Deliberation Committee and were entitled to re- 
ceive tax benefits such as an exemption from corporate income tax and acquisi- 
tion tax in connection with the sale of real estate or subsidiaries. 
The principal  transactions banks selected candidate companies that might 
take over problem corporations and negotiated the terms with them. The terms 
of the financial support package were then examined and coordinated by the 
Office of  Bank Supervision and Examination before they were confirmed by 
the Ministry of  Finance through consultation with other involved ministries 
and agencies. 
In the restructuring process, financial support played a critical role and was 
given in the form of (1) grace periods of up to 30 years for principal repayment, 
(2) subsidized long-term loans, (3)  the combination of the previous two, or 
(4) the write-off of principal. To ease the burden of financial support borne by 
banks in the course of restructuring, sizable subsidized credit was extended by 
the Bank of Korea. 
Before this massive restructuring, in 1985, the Kukje group, which was the 
sixth largest business group in terms of total sales at the end of  1983, with 23 
member corporations, was completely broken up. Before the break-up, Korea 
First Bank, the group’s principal transactions bank, and several other banks 
provided substantial emergency credit. Continuing emergency credit to a large 
business group would have had grave impact on the reserve management of the 
banks and on the monetary control of the authorities. Thus, the decision to 
provide  or to stop emergency  credit could not  be  made solely by  the bank 
without consulting the monetary authorities. In addition, providing substantial 
emergency credit required the formation of  a loan consortium to relieve the 
principal transactions bank of the financial burden. However, without leader- 287  The Search for a New Bank-Business Relationship in Korea 
ship strong enough to organize and lead the consortium, a principal transac- 
tions  bank  usually  needs tacit  support from the  government.  Together with 
its  decision  to  stop providing  emergency  credit,  the  principal  transactions 
bank formed an inspection team with other creditor banks to examine the fi- 
nancial situation of the group and to search for prospective buyers. Eventually, 
each member corporation of the Kukje group was taken over by another corpo- 
ration. 
Restrictions on Real Estate Acquisitions and Investment in New Business 
Until 1993,  business groups had to obtain prior approval from their principal 
transactions bank when they wanted to invest in new business (i.e., establishing 
a subsidiary, buying an existing company, equity participation, and merger) or 
acquire real estate. The restrictions were intended to induce specialization of 
business groups and discourage debt-financed expansion of business areas and 
acquisition of nonoperating real estate. In most cases, approval was given on 
the condition that the business group make “self-help efforts” worth 200-600 
percent of the investment amount. Self-help effort included such activities as 
raising  new capital by  selling real estate or securities holdings, issuing new 
stocks, and disposing of shares of large shareholders. The required level of 
self-help effort varied depending on the purpose of the investment and whether 
the investing corporation and the business group satisfied their guided equity 
ratios. 
However, entering 1994, the restrictions on investment in real estate and new 
business were relaxed significantly. They were completely abolished for the 
eleventh to thirtieth largest business groups. For the 10 largest groups, ex post 
reporting largely replaced prior approval from the principal transactions bank, 
and the burden of  self-help effort was lightened to 100-200  percent of the 
investment amount. 
10.4  Evaluation of the Principal Transactions Bank System 
10.4.1  Performance of the Credit Control System 
The role of Korean principal transactions banks is defined within the credit 
control system imposed on business groups, which began as an institutional 
mechanism designed to alleviate the side effects of strong government support 
for business groups through intervention  in credit allocation in earlier years. 
Thus, an evaluation of the credit control system should be based on its contri- 
bution to alleviating such side effects-that  is, how effectively it (1) improves 
large corporations’ capital structure, (2)  alleviates concentration of economic 
power and corrects disproportionate credit allocation, and (3) strengthens the 
manufacturing industry’s competitiveness. 
1. The credit control system does not seem to have contributed to the im- 
provement of the capital structure of large corporations in any significant way. 288  Sang-Woo Nam 
No separate data are available on the changes in capital structure of  subject 
companies since the introduction of  the credit control system in  1974. How- 
ever, the capital structure of  large manufacturing  firms worsened  during the 
1970s, and  these  companies  faced severe financial  difficulties  after making 
large investments in heavy and chemical industries. The equity ratio of the 30 
largest business groups rose from 17.4 to 20.8 percent between 1986 and 1990 
(table 10.4). This improvement, however, was mainly attributable to the stock 
market boom  between  1987 and  1989. As corporations faced difficulties  in 
direct financing due to the downturn of  the stock market  in the early  1990s, 
their capital structure worsened again with increased borrowing from banks5 
2. With respect to reducing the concentration of  economic power and pro- 
viding more equitable access to credit, the credit control system seems to have 
been successful. As a result of  introducing basket credit control in  1984, the 
share of the 30 largest business groups’ bank loans that were subject to credit 
control fell from 25.3 percent of total bank loans in  1986 to 13.5 percent in 
1990, on a year-end basis. Including loans not subject to credit control, their 
share in total bank loans fell from 28.6 percent in 1986 to 19.4 percent at the 
end of  1990 (table 10.5).6 
It is noteworthy, however, that the large business groups’ share in total credit 
of  nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) such as short-term finance compa- 
nies, merchant banking corporations, and insurance companies, whose credit 
is not subject to credit control, has substantially increased. In other words, the 
credit control system has, to a large extent, shifted the financing demand of 
business groups from the banking sector to NBFIs.’ 
Furthermore, the credit control system appears to have been unsuccessful in 
discouraging business diversification.  Between  1986 and  1991, 20 of  the 30 
largest  business  groups  increased  their  number  of  member  corporations  in 
spite of the burden of self-help financing effort (table  10.6). Of course, the 
number of member firms is not an accurate measure of business diversification, 
and diversification activity might have been more pronounced without credit 
control. 
3. Concern over the deteriorating competitiveness of the manufacturing in- 
dustry resulted in the exemption of Major corporations from credit control in 
5. Corporate capital structure seems to be determined mainly by  a corporation’s  financing needs. 
The equity ratios of the major Japanese manufacturing firms declined steadily during the postwar 
high-growth period from a 40 percent level in 1955 to below 19 percent during 1974-76. 
6. The share of the 30 largest business groups in manufacturing sales and value-added began to 
decline in 1984 at the same time as the start of basket credit control. However, basket credit control 
was only one of the reasons for this decline. In the mid-l980s, the manufacturing sector showed 
strong growth accompanied by a large increase in the number of business establishmcnts, which 
reduced the relative importance of the large business groups. Reinforced fair trade regulations also 
checked the expansion of  these corporations. On the other hand, as the economy became more 
mature, business groups started to attach greater importance to service industries such as finance 
and information. 
7. The share of the 30 largest business groups in total equity of  all financial institutions other 
than nationwide commercial banks was 45 percent at the end of  1991 (Maeil Kyungje, October 
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Table 10.4  The Equity Ratio of Korean Corporations (%) 
Manufacturing 
Corporations 
Year  Total  Corporations  Credit Control 

































































Source: Bank of Korea (various issues). 
Table 10.5  Share of the 30 Largest Business Groups in Bank Loans 
and in GDP (%) 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Share in bank loans 
Loans subject to credit control  25.3  21.6  18.6  14.7  13.5  8% 
Total loans  28.6  26.3  24.2  20.7  19.4  18.9 
Share in NBFI credit  -  37.9  36.5  42.1  43.6  - 
Share in GDP  -  14.6  13.5  14.1  -  - 
Equity ratio  17.4  19.8  24.7  23.8  20.8  19.4 
Sources: Korea Investors Service, Inc. (1988, 1989, 1990); Management Efficiency Research In- 
stitute (1987); MaeilKyungje (March 31, 1992); Min (1991, 117). 
aExcluding credit to Major Corporations, Corporations with Highly Dispersed Ownership, loans 
extended by overseas bank branches, and postshipment export financing. 
1991. Due to this relaxation, in 1991 bank loans to 76 Major Corporations of 
the 30 largest business groups rose by 38.1 percent over the previous year. This 
increase contrasts with those of  total bank loans (23.6 percent increase) and 
loans to non-Major  Corporations in the 30 largest business groups (8.6 percent 
increase). It is still too early to evaluate the impact of this inducement to spe- 
cialization on the strengthening of  manufacturing competitiveness. No such 290  Sang-Woo Narn 
Table 10.6  Number of Member Companies of the 30 Largest Business Groups 
April 
1986  1991 


















































































































































































































































Sources: Office of Bank Supervision and Examination (1992);  Mueil Kvungje (May 7, 1991) 
impact would be expected  to the extent of  credit diversion  from the  Major 
Corporations to other firms of a business group. 
10.4.2  Problems with the Credit Control System 
While the credit control system has had only limited success in achieving 
its goals, it has incurred heavy regulatory costs to both banks and subject cor- 
porations.  Our interest  here  is  to  review  the  nature  and  the  magnitude  of 
these costs. 
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conflict between the government and the corporate sector. The corporate sec- 
tor’s  resistance  to the  system  was  not  apparent  in  the  beginning  but  grew 
stronger in the  1980s as credit control became  in essence a way to regulate 
business activities. This problem became more serious as government support 
for the corporate sector was largely reduced and stronger private sector initia- 
tive became necessary to meet successfully the challenge of intensified global 
competition. 
The credit control system also has seriously hampered  autonomous bank 
management. With the right of prior approval over various corporate activities 
and the authority to penalize client companies, principal transactions banks are 
positioned as subordinate organizations of the Office of Bank Supervision and 
Examination. They are obligated to collect information and report to the Office 
of Bank Supervision and Examination in connection with the implementation 
of credit control. They are subject to penalties such as restricted access to cen- 
tral bank credit and penalty  interest rates  in the event of  violating relevant 
regulations or neglecting their duties as principal transactions banks. 
The credit control burden of commercial banks is known to be so substantial 
as to require one-third of  their loan officers. There are also many difficulties in 
evaluating whether real estate is nonoperating  or not for tax purposes. The 
many unnecessary and trivial items that need the approval of principal transac- 
tions banks  have been  a major  source of  inefficiency  and conflict  between 
banks and their client corporations.8 
The bank-enterprise relationship in the framework of the credit control sys- 
tem is that of the supervisor and the supervised. Autonomy in bank manage- 
ment and a cooperative bank-enterprise relationship are seriously impaired un- 
der the current system, in which control over corporate clients carried out on 
behalf of the government constitutes a substantial part of banking business. 
The current system of credit operation, which focuses on conformity to rules 
and regulations, should be replaced by one that nourishes a spontaneous and 
cooperative relationship between banks and their clients. To the extent that the 
government-bank-enterprise partnership constitutes a critical superstructure in 
determining industrial competence  in the global economy,  Korean corpora- 
tions seem to be handicapped. 
The  current  credit  control  system  pursues  two  conflicting  objectives: 
strengthening manufacturing competitiveness and reducing the concentration 
of economic power. This conflict makes the government’s policy choices chal- 
lenging. By exempting the Major Corporations from credit control, the govern- 
8. Despite substantial operative inefficiency inflicted on banks and corporations, it is question- 
able whether overall allocative efficiency was as seriously hampered as operative efficiency. Be- 
cause large corporations can utilize other financing sources, such as NBFIs, capital markets, and 
foreign capital, as well as fund diversion among firms within a group, their total financing capacity 
does not seem to be seriously diminished by  limited bank credit. Even though some delay and 
additional costs are inevitable in financing, it is doubtful that a member firm of a large business 
group would have given up a promising investment project because of credit control regulations. 292  Sang-Woo Nam 
ment has given priority to strengthening the international competitiveness of 
industries at the cost of more equitable access to credit and reduced concentra- 
tion of economic power. 
The problem, however, is that the system might produce results that defeat 
its goal of strengthened manufacturing competitiveness. For instance, business 
groups tended to select those firms with large financing requirements as their 
Major Corporations rather than those with good prospects of gaining interna- 
tional competitiveness. For example, each of the five largest business groups 
have chosen as one of their Major Corporations a petrochemical company. 
The relaxation  of credit control on Major Corporations  may  bring  about 
credit diversion from Major to non-Major Corporations to circumvent credit 
control. If  such diversion  actually occurs, the credit control  system  can no 
longer correct the concentrated access to credit. Loans to Major Corporations 
and Corporations with Highly Dispersed Ownership, which are not subject to 
credit control, accounted for 53.6 percent of total loans to the 30 largest busi- 
ness groups at the end of  1991. Accordingly, the share of loans to the 30 largest 
business groups under credit control declined to 8.8 percent of total bank loans 
outstanding at the end of  199  1. 
Under the Operational Bylaw on Credit Control over Business Groups, prin- 
cipal transactions banks are required to submit quarterly monitoring reports to 
the Office of  Bank Supervision and Examination concerning loans to Major 
Corporations and to revoke the designation of Major Corporation in the event 
of diversion of credit to other uses. Despite this severe penalty, room for diver- 
sion always exists because monitoring the use of bank loans is practically dif- 
ficult in the case of operating capital and banks have to make judgments mainly 
on the basis of data presented by the Major Corporations themselves. 
In  addition, repayment  guarantees  issued  by  the  Major  Corporations  for 
other member companies, roughly equivalent to three times their equity capi- 
tal, represent de facto credit diversion. At the end of June 1992, payment guar- 
antees for corporations belonging to the 30 largest business groups amounted 
to four times their equity capital (table 10.7). To  redress such problems, the 
government revised the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, forcing busi- 
Table 10.7  Equity Capital and Payment Guarantees of the 30 Largest Business 
Groups (end of June 1992; billion won) 
Outstanding Cross- 
Equity Capital  Payment Guarantees 
Groups  (A)  (B)  BIA 
Groups 1-5  16,315  77.821  4.8 
Groups 6-30  15,087  47,83  1  3.2 
Total  3 1,402  125,652  4.0 
Source; Office of Bank Supervision and Examination (1992). 293  The Search for a New Bank-Business Relationship in Korea 
ness groups to limit their cross-payment guarantees to a maximum of 200 per- 
cent of their equity capital within three years from April  1993. The task of 
mitigating economic concentration by business groups, one of the major objec- 
tives of  the credit control system, has been passed on to the domain of fair 
trade policy. 
10.5  A Search for a Desirable Bank-Business Relationship 
10.5.1  Comparison of the Principal Transactions Bank System with the 
Japanese Main Bank System 
Characteristics  of  the  principal transactions  bank  system become clearer 
when it is compared with the Japanese main bank system. First, the principal 
transactions bank  system in Korea is officially defined by  the regulations of 
the Monetary Board, while the Japanese main bank system is defined by the 
conventional  customer relationship between banks  and  their client corpora- 
tions. Principal transactions banks in Korea, in effect, function as a substruc- 
ture, or subordinate organizations, of the Office of Bank Supervision and Ex- 
amination, controlling credit supply to client corporations and gathering and 
reporting information on their financial and credit situations. 
Second, the  main bank  system in  Japan  represents  a rather  broad-based 
bank-enterprise  relationship,  with  about  30  percent  of  corporations  having 
such a relationship with their banks (Horiuchi 1990, 1). The principal transac- 
tions bank system in Korea, however, applies only to corporations belonging 
to the 30 largest business groups in terms of borrowing from banks. At the end 
of April  1992, the number of companies belonging to the 30 largest groups 
under direct credit control of their principal transactions banks was 591. Other 
corporations also have banks with which they have closer business relationship 
than with other banks. These banks, however, do not seem to play special roles 
which deserve general definition. 
Third, the relationship between corporations belonging to Japanese business 
groups and their main banks is based on mutual equity ownership. In Korea, 
however, no such relationship is found. Only a few business groups hold equity 
shares in their principal transactions banks (table 10.2). In some of these cases, 
the shares just represent shareholding by their securities or insurance affiliates 
as part of their portfolio management. Also, the level of shareholding by those 
business groups is far lower than the 8 percent limit that a stockholder can have 
in the nationwide commercial banks. This lack of interest in holding shares of 
principal transactions banks might result from the tight credit control over the 
business groups and the government’s influence over bank management, such 
as the appointment of top managers. On the other hand, there are some cases 
in which a principal transactions bank holds shares in its client corporations. 
Such holdings are, however, only for the purpose of asset management and do 
not represent part of the principal transactions bank relationship. While banks 294  Sang-Woo Nam 
in the Japanese main bank system often play roles as both lender and share- 
holder,  the role of  their  Korean  counterparts  is limited  to that  of  lender. A 
cooperative relationship between banks and their corporate clients, in  which 
both  parties  share mutual  benefits  by  reducing  information  asymmetry,  is 
rarely found in Korea. 
Fourth,  although  both  Korea  and  Japan  relied  heavily  on  government- 
initiated industrial policies, such as government intervention in credit alloca- 
tion, the passive or subordinate role of Korean banks has led to inefficiency in 
resource allocation. In Japan, the main-bank-enterprise  relationship  has pro- 
vided a double-check mechanism regarding the prospect of planned projects. 
But  Korean  industrial  policy  has  left  little room for principal  transactions 
banks to evaluate the major industrial projects whose undertaking and under- 
takers were decided by the government, making it difficult for a principal trans- 
actions bank to refuse the loans. When a loan consortium is formed by several 
banks to meet a large investment requirement, the share of  each bank in the 
consortium has usually been allocated by  the government. As a result of this 
lack of autonomy, banks have been more concerned about securing collateral 
than undertaking credit evaluation, which in turn has led corporations to hold 
more real estate to offer as collateral. This difference in the role of main banks 
in the evaluation of projects and borrowers’ creditworthiness must have led to 
the different investment performances of the two countries. 
Finally, the role of a principal transactions bank as an overall financial super- 
visor and a delegated monitor of its client corporations is much weaker than 
that of a Japanese main bank. Unlike Japanese main banks, Korean principal 
transactions banks perform these functions only in special circumstances,  as 
when a large client corporation is insolvent. This limited role seems to reflect 
primarily the fact that a principal transactions bank neither necessarily accepts 
a disproportionate  share of the cost of  rescuing or liquidating troubled firms 
nor takes strong leadership in forming loan consortiums. It may also represent 
moral hazard behavior in the belief that the government will take responsibility 
in the worst-case scenario given the government initiative at the planning stage. 
Moral hazard might also result from the practice of  cross-repayment guaran- 
tees among member firms of a group. In fact, except for the Kukje case, in 
which a whole group was broken up and taken over by other firms, member 
firms of  large business  groups have rarely  been  liquidated  or rescued from 
serious financial difficulty by their principal transactions banks. 
Another reason for the relative passivity of principal transactions  banks is 
the ownership concentration of  large corporations. In 1991, 14 percent of the 
total shares of the 30 largest groups were held by the group chairmen and their 
families and another 33 percent were held by member firms of the group. These 
combined holdings decreased only to 43 percent in  1993. Because the chair- 
man, who has absolute management control of a business group, tends to be 
very cautious about revealing management information to outsiders, the func- 
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been weak. Corporate clients’ lack of confidence in their principal transactions 
banks as serious evaluators of the clients themselves or their investment proj- 
ects might also be partly responsible for the weak role of the banks. 
10.5.2 
The Japanese Main Bank System as a Model 
In the search for a more desirable bank-client relationship in Korea, a useful 
starting point may be an evaluation of the efficiency of the Japanese main bank 
system. First, the main bank system seems to be efficient in reducing informa- 
tion  asymmetry. A Japanese main bank has responsibilities  as the leader of 
loan syndication and as the delegated monitor for other creditor banks. It also 
takes on a special degree of exposure if necessary and bears loss beyond its 
exposure if a client defaults on loans. With these responsibilities in a market 
in which  information  about borrowers is limited  and costly to obtain, main 
banks make continuous investments in monitoring, which enables them to ac- 
cumulate information about borrowing firms at lower cost. 
This close monitoring may also improve corporate performance by eliminat- 
ing any motivation  to  shirk and by  reducing  other agency costs of external 
finance. Borrowing firms have incentives to reveal confidential information to 
their main banks because it helps them to overcome the liquidity constraints 
of relying on internal finance and to reduce the cost of reorganizing  and re- 
structuring in the worst cases of distress. Those main banks or corporate bor- 
rowers that have not met their implied obligations and, thus, are perceived to be 
unreliable partners,  suffer serious damage to their reputations. This potential 
penalty  discourages  credit diversion or other opportunistic  behavior by  bor- 
rowing firms and makes main banks willingly assume additional risk or loss 
when their corporate clients are in distress. 
Mutual shareholding between main banks and their corporate clients is an 
important feature of the Japanese main bank system. Main bank ownership of 
shares of borrowing firms (up to a 5 percent limit) makes the relationship and 
monitoring  close  and  effective.  Bank  shares  are  also  frequently  held  by 
friendly industrial firms with which they have a main bank relationship. Bank 
ownership of corporate shares in Japan contrasts with U.S. legislation and Brit- 
ish custom, which prohibits such ownership. 
The main bank relationship, however, has elements of inefficiency and un- 
fairness as well. The relationship  is basically  a secretive and exclusive one. 
Main banks’ insider access to information about their client firms and the re- 
lated nontransparency  may create opportunities  for fraud or exploitation for 
the benefit of the banks and involved individuals. The exclusive insider system 
with bamers to entry by outsiders may result in oligopolistic behavior. More 
important, the close main bank relationship  may tend to bail out firms that 
should have been liquidated. 
Given  the overall evaluation, the main  bank  system would  likely serve a 
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useful function in Korea as well. Korean financial markets are far from per- 
fectly competitive and complete. Systems for corporate accounting, auditing, 
disclosure, and credit rating are yet to be firmly established in Korea. In a still- 
shallow securities market, insider trading, price manipulation, and other unfair 
transactions are not effectively regulated. As a result, information asymmetry 
is large, the search for accurate information is costly, and incentives for fraud 
or abuse of  conflicts of  interest are strong. In this world of  incomplete  and 
asymmetric information, the role of banks as credit analysts and monitors of 
corporate  borrowers  is  critical.  This function  of  banks,  however,  has  been 
largely neglected  owing to the heavy intervention  of the government in the 
allocation of bank credit and the prevalent practice of collateral requirement 
for bank loans. 
However, the drawbacks of the main bank system mentioned  above make 
the question of who will monitor the main banks very important. First of  all, 
the role of the Office of Bank Supervision and Examination  would become 
more important. The office is advised to shift its major effort from controlling 
credit to securing the soundness of bank management and preventing unfair 
practices. In Korea, the government is also considering  a few alternatives to 
make banks more responsible for their own management.  One of them is to 
have banks set up a Council of Large Stockholders, composed of five to ten 
major shareholders  who own more than  1 percent  of  the bank’s stock. The 
council will monitor bank management. Another alternative is to allow an indi- 
vidual to hold up to, say, 15 percent of a bank’s stock on the condition that the 
person does not own any nonfinancial firms. The existence of an owner with 
management control will make bank management more accountable. 
Inducing Autonomous Relationship Banking 
The next question is, How can Korean banks and their corporate clients be 
encouraged to establish close relationships similar to the Japanese main bank 
system? This task should first be approached by eliminating the institutional 
constraints and improving the policy environment that have suppressed the in- 
centives for credit evaluation and close monitoring of corporate borrowers. In 
this respect, the current  system  of  credit  control  and principal  transactions 
banks should be transformed to a more autonomous bank-client relationship, 
with less emphasis on the supervisory function of banks. In fact, credit control 
procedures  are being  simplified, and the current  system of  approval by  the 
principal transactions banks for corporate investment in other businesses and 
real estate is being phased out. Easing of excessive concentration of economic 
power and specialization of business groups may better be induced with the 
provisions of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act and the Industrial 
Development Law. Likewise, speculation  in real estate may be addressed by 
strengthening related tax laws and their implementation. Ultimately, the credit 
control system will have to focus on maintaining prudence and soundness in 
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Moreover, commercial banks should gradually be relieved of the burden of 
extending policy  loans. Policy  loans by banks still account for a substantial 
portion of their loan portfolios. They include loans to development institutions, 
the housing  and agricultural sectors, and small and medium-sized  firms and 
foreign currency loans mainly for capital goods  imports. Until commercial 
banks are freed from the obligation of supplying policy loans, financial liberal- 
ization will be limited and an autonomous, cooperative bank-client  relation- 
ship will be  inhibited. Preferential policy  loans  may be  needed  in order to 
alleviate market imperfections, as is the case for risky projects with long gesta- 
tion periods and anticipated positive externalities for the economy. Subsidized 
credit may also be provided out of social considerations. This obligation, how- 
ever, should be fulfilled from the government budget rather than by commer- 
cial banks. 
Finally, the practice of requiring collateral should be improved to serve as a 
complement to, rather than a substitute for, costly credit analysis and monitor- 
ing. The majority of bank loans in Korea are secured by collateral, whose value 
exceeds the loan amount by at least 30-50  percent. All the costs of  insuring, 
registering, and disposing of the collateral are also borne by borrowers. In ad- 
dition, borrowers are required to provide a surety liable jointly and severally 
for their borrowing. Fully protected from default risk, banks have little incen- 
tive to begin serious credit evaluation, monitoring, and investment on informa- 
tion by relationship banking. Banks may actually be better off when borrowing 
firms go bankrupt and heavy penalty interest is collected for the delay in repay- 
ment. This incentive  structure is likely to result in adverse selection, which 
may be even worse when banks are allowed to charge differential interest rates 
depending on the creditworthiness of borrowers. 
The bargaining  power  of  borrowing firms is, however, improving, as the 
excess demand situation in the bank loan market is eased with the deregulation 
of  interest rates, increase in loanable funds, and diversification  of corporate 
financing sources for larger firms. Even before pressures from the changing 
market correct the situation, it may be advisable to regulate the irrational prac- 
tices related to securing bank loans. For instance, security or subrogation by a 
surety may be limited up to the loan amount. 
With a view to encouraging a binding relationship between a bank and its 
corporate  clients, mutual equity holding may be considered. Given  Korea’s 
industrial organization and the realities of corporate governance, however, this 
arrangement may  still be premature. As entry into banking is restricted  and 
bank  loans have a subsidy element,  allowing large business  groups to hold 
controlling shares of banks  would be  an unjustifiable  favor to the business 
groups. Even when  financial markets are competitive with free entry, a mix 
of  financial and nonfinancial products within a business group increases the 
probability  of  abuses as long as the member firms have market power in the 
nonfinancial products. Given the highly oligopolistic Korean market structure, 
where large business groups have market-dominating power (table  10.8), the 298  Sang-Woo Nam 
Table 10.8  Share of the 5 and 30 Largest Business Groups in Manufacturing 
Sales and Employment 
I977  1982  1987  1989 
Sales 
5 Largest  15.7  22.6  22.0  21.3 
30 Largest  34.  I  40.7  37.3  35.4 
5 Largest  -  8.9”  9.9  9.9 
30 Largest  -  18.6“  18.1  16.8 
Employment 
Sources; Jung and Yang (1992, 40-4  I );  Korea Development Institute, Seoul, and other unpub- 
lished survey data at Korea Development Institute, 
“Figure for 1983. 
room  for abusing  conflicts  of  interest  through  tie-in  sales,  for instance,  is 
potentially great. 
On the other hand, banks may enhance their role as shareholders of client 
corporations. As both  a lender and a shareholder, a bank representative may 
serve as an outside member of the board, with access to corporate inside infor- 
mation. However, corporate management, including that of business groups, is 
typically  very concentrated,  with its major owner  the central figure. In this 
management structure, outside board members are not expected to be well uti- 
lized as management supervisors. Only when management and ownership are 
largely separated in Korean business firms may banks be able to play a signifi- 
cant role as shareholders and corporate insiders. 
Major Clients for Relationship Banking 
As has been the case in Japan for some time, Korea’s large business groups 
will rely less on bank loans because they will borrow increasingly from abroad 
at low cost and utilize less-expensive securities finance. With the development 
of such practices as accounting, auditing, securities analysis, and credit rating, 
which reduce information asymmetry and increase relevant information at low 
cost, large corporations will find it easier and cheaper to finance in the securi- 
ties market. However, the role of banks is not confined to lending but includes 
diverse financial services. Because the number of  banks with such capacity is 
limited, very large healthy business corporations  are likely to develop close 
relationships  with  several  nationwide  city  banks  according  to  the  major 
strength of  each bank. 
These relationships between fairly large corporations and their banks will 
resemble those of Japanese core banks. This relationship  will basically be a 
rather competitive one. The client corporations will not wish to commit them- 
selves to a binding  relationship  with any one bank but will rather maintain 
financial transactions with several banks, keeping them at arm’s length. Banks 
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client relationships, which will improve banking services and enhance banks’ 
capabilities. As the relationship is not an exclusive or binding one, it will al- 
ways be  subject to change depending  on the results of  competition through 
repeated transactions. 
On the other hand, with the increasing supply of loanable funds relative to 
demand, banks  are expected to form much closer and binding  (main bank) 
relationships with the smaller large corporations and medium-sized firms that 
have good growth prospects. For small and medium-sized firms, it is difficult 
to utilize the capital market. This difficulty is due mainly to high transactions 
costs for small-scale financing, as well as the high cost of information arising 
from poor bookkeeping and lack of transparency  in management. Thus, such 
firms rely heavily on bank and nonbank borrowing (table 10.9). 
Although  the  major firms of large business groups may  opt out of  close 
and binding relationships with banks, many large firms will remain. This is so 
because  the  expected  returns  on  continuous  investment  in monitoring  are 
higher in the case of larger firms. As business firms grow, they typically need 
wide-ranging consulting and banking services regarding corporate finance and 
treasury. In return for entering into a special relationship, they have much lu- 
crative financial business to offer to their banks, including transactions depos- 
its, foreign exchange business, trusteeship, and other fee-generating business. 
Entering a binding relationship with small firms with all the implied commit- 
ments is in general too risky for banks, given these firms’ uncertain prospects, 
lack of operational transparency, and paucity of expected banking business. 
10.6  Conclusion 
The principal transactions bank system in Korea was introduced in order to 
correct  the  skewed  allocation  of  bank  credit.  which  was  the  result  of 
Table 10.9  Sources of Funds for Manufacturing  Firms (a) 
Source 
Small and Medium- 
Large Finns  sized Firms 
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government-led economic development. Now, two decades after its introduc- 
tion, there seems to be broad agreement that the current system of credit con- 
trol and principal transactions banks needs to be redefined in light of the huge 
challenges of successfully liberalizing and opening the economy. 
The regulatory mechanism of the system unduly restricts corporate activity 
and imposes operational burdens on the principal transactions banks. An  au- 
tonomous and close bank-business relationship cannot be fostered because the 
banks have functioned as de facto suborganizations of the supervisory authori- 
ties. Korea’s principal transactions banks have not assumed the implicit obliga- 
tions of the Japanese main banks, such as a disproportionate burden in rescuing 
or liquidating troubled firms. With its role as a delegated monitor very much 
limited, the banking sector as a whole is not efficient in generating information 
and reducing information asymmetry about borrowing firms. Furthermore, the 
current credit control system seems to be ineffective in  serving the two con- 
flicting objectives of strengthening  industrial competitiveness  and mitigating 
the concentration of economic power. 
As envisaged by  the  government, credit  control  and other restrictions  on 
corporate  investment and financing should be phased  out. Such concerns  as 
excessive concentration of economic power and speculation in real estate may 
be addressed under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act and relevant 
tax laws. Reduction of government intervention in the loan portfolios of com- 
mercial banks, such as the obligation to provide policy loans, also will help 
nourish  close  and  autonomous bank-business  relationships.  Moreover,  the 
prevalent practices of repayment guarantees by other member firms of a busi- 
ness group and collateral requirements for loans should be discouraged. They 
largely nullify any need for serious credit evaluation or monitoring on the part 
of banks. 
Excessive collateral requirements, however, are expected to be eased gradu- 
ally with the deregulation of interest rates, increase in loanable funds, and di- 
versification  of  corporate  financing  sources,  including  access to  the capital 
market. These structural changes in the financial market will also induce the 
largest and leading business firms to rely less on bank credit and to maintain 
rather competitive relationships with several “core” banks. Banks are likely to 
develop closer and more binding relationships with slightly smaller business 
firms. Attracted  by  large potential  contributions  to bank  profitability,  banks 
will be willing to enter into exclusive relationships with these firms. Such rela- 
tionships will most probably imply an understanding that the firm allows the 
bank to supply a substantial portion of its lucrative banking services, to share 
its inside information, and to conduct close monitoring in return for the expec- 
tation of emergency loans and other rescue operations in situations of  finan- 
cial distress. 301  The Search for a New Bank-Business Relationship in Korea 
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Comment  Akiyoshi Horiuchi 
Nam gives an overview of  the principal transactions bank system in Korea. He 
describes the evolution of this system, introduced in 1874, evaluates its impact 
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on corporate behavior in Korea, and compares it with the Japanese main bank 
system. His explanation in this paper is excellent. Although I am not an expert 
on the Korean economy, I have some knowledge of the relationships between 
Korea’s major banks and major corporations and the government policy stance 
toward credit allocation. I would like to comment on his argument about the 
workings of the principal transactions bank system and then proceed to discuss 
briefly  his  comparison  between  this  system  and  the  Japanese  main  bank 
system. 
Nam emphasizes that because the principal transactions bank system was 
introduced on the government’s initiative, it has played the subordinate role of 
implementing credit control designed by the government. According to Nam, 
this role has been  a major reason for the unsatisfactory performance  of  this 
system since the 1980s. Since principal transactions banks have not been able 
to determine credit allocation to the major corporations, they have had little 
incentive to pursue serious credit evaluation,  monitoring, and investment on 
information concerning major borrower firms. Nam suggests that this attitude 
on the part  of  the  banking  sector produced  inefficiency  in  corporate  man- 
agement. 
One of  the Korean government’s most important goals in introducing the 
credit control system, through the principal transactions banks, was to improve 
the soundness of the corporate sector. This policy reminds me of the Japanese 
government’s concern for the soundness of Japan’s corporate sector in the first 
stage of the high-growth period. Like the Korean government,  the Japanese 
government worried about the “abnormally” low equity ratio levels of the ma- 
jor companies. The government, particularly the monetary authorities, urged in 
vain companies and major financial institutions to improve companies’ equity 
ratios. On the other hand, Japanese banks did not seem to cooperate with the 
monetary authorities. Rather they actively helped their major client firms in- 
crease their leverage ratios. Thus, during the high-growth period, the Japanese 
main banks contributed to industrial development by making it possible for the 
corporate  sector to decrease  equity  ratios  without  incurring  substantial in- 
creases in bankruptcy costs. In this sense, as Nam points out, the Korean prin- 
cipal transactions bank system is very different from the Japanese main bank 
system. 
In my understanding, the Korean economy has a deep and wide curb capital 
market. In contrast, there is no comparable curb capital market in Japan. The 
existence of an informal capital market might influence the performance  of 
credit control policy designed by the government. Nam does not explain ex- 
plicitly the influence of the curb capital market on the efficiency of government 
credit control policy. 
Nam strongly argues that the Korean economy should have much more au- 
tonomous  bank-enterprise  relationships,  like  Japanese  main  bank  relation- 
ships. I fundamentally agree with his argument that the Korean banking sector 
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that the main bank relationship in Japan is not almighty in financially promot- 
ing industrial development. The main bank can be an efficient monitor of its 
client firms’ managers  so as to prevent inefficient management.  But Japan’s 
capital markets have not yet resolved the problem of who can efficiently moni- 
tor the monitor. Furthermore, major companies have gradually extended their 
fund-raising opportunities outside the bank loan market. If capital markets out- 
side bank loan markets are not efficient enough, this expansion of firms’ fund- 
raising power may  weaken banks’ power to control corporate management. 
This structural  change may  threaten  development  potential  in the Japanese 
economy. The recent experience in the Japanese corporate sector clearly sug- 
gests the need for a well-developed capital market competitive with banking 
in order to preserve efficient industrial evolution. 
We have observed both in Japan and Korea the progress of securitization in 
major firms’ finance. The weight of banking business has thus shifted gradu- 
ally from big-company  finance to small-scale  enterprise  finance. But some 
scholars worry that the full-scale development of capital markets might prevent 
banks from cultivating relationships with small-scale enterprises. This is be- 
cause developed capital markets would give rise to a problem of time inconsis- 
tency in the sense that, while in their infancy borrower firms are eager to re- 
ceive financial support  from their main  banks, after establishing  their  own 
status in financial markets, such firms would wish to sever relations with their 
main banks. If this is a possibility, banks would hesitate to develop intimate 
main  bank  relationships  with  newly  established  enterprises.  Thus, a  well- 
developed  capital  market outside  the banking sector ironically  may  hinder 
main bank relationships with small-scale enterprises, as suggested a few years 
ago by Colin Mayer (1988). 
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Comment  Shang-Jin Wei 
A well-written paper is a discussant’s enemy, and this paper is my enemy. In 
this smoothly constructed paper, Sang-Woo Nam has presented a clear descrip- 
tion of the main features of the current principal transaction bank (PTB) sys- 
tem, its shortcomings, and a proposal for reform. I have no ground to dispute 
the factual description. 
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A discussant’s job is not complete if he does not quibble. I have two quibbles 
on this paper. First, I will express my idiosyncratic view on where Nam’s anal- 
ysis of the PTB system may be modified. Second, I  will suggest that Nam’s 
reform proposal needs more justification that he has offered so far. 
Let me start with my first comment. The PTB system in Korea has three 
salient features: (1) The government designates, or induces the banking sector 
and firms to self-designate, a PTB for each large business group (according 
the borrowing  volume of  the main firms in a group). (2)  Other banks do not 
lend  to a business group  without  first consulting  with  and presumably  ob- 
taining some tacit approval from the relevant PTB. (I may be reading too much 
into the paper on this point.) (3) A PTB is to undertake monitoring of invest- 
ment and other financial transactions for all firms in the business group, to 
enforce credit control (later on to discourage real estate transactions), and to 
report to the Office of Bank Supervision and Examination. Later, each group 
can designate a few firms to be exempted from credit control. 
A few implications are immediately clear from this setup. First, the PTB- 
firm relationship is a government-fostered creature, as opposed to a market- 
generated institution. Second, there is an anticompetitive element in the system 
for Korea’s banking sector. That is, the PTB system enables the five large banks 
to divide up the banking business of large business groups and then maintain 
a quasi-monopolistic position in the relevant segment of the market. Third, the 
PTBs operate as an extension of a government regulatory agency, namely, the 
Office of Bank Supervision and Examination. These features are important in 
one’s evaluation of the system. 
I agree with Nam’s evaluation of the PTB system with one exception. Let 
me explain this exception. Nam argues that the system has been successful in 
reducing the concentration of economic power and providing equitable access 
to credit. As supportive evidence, he cites data on the share of large business 
groups’ loans (which fell from 25.3 percent in 1986 to 13.5 percent in 1990). 
I think that he may be too generous on this point. As Nam realizes, there was 
a great deal of  substitution  of  borrowing  from nonbank  financial institutions 
for borrowing from the banks. Taking into account this substitution, the actual 
constraint the PTB system places on the large business groups is substantially 
more limited than their numerical share in total bank loans may imply. Second, 
as far as concentration of economic power is concerned, it seems that a better 
indicator might be the shares of the large business groups in total output, total 
employment, or total manufacture sales. Nam’s paper does report some statis- 
tics on the share in manufacture sales (table 10.8). Indeed, during the period 
1977-89,  there was no evidence that the large business groups’ share was de- 
clining. On the contrary, the top five groups’ share increased from 15.7 percent 
in  1977 to 21.3 percent in  1989. One reason that the large groups were still 
able to expand rapidly  despite the PTBs and the associated credit crunch, I 
believe, was the large groups’ ability to substitute among financing sources. 
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gated is the magnitude of the efficiency loss. The restriction on large groups’ 
credit access appears to be entirely motivated by equity or redistribution con- 
siderations. There is a nonnegligible amount of efficiency loss due to this ad- 
ministrative, and to a large extent arbitrary, restriction. It would be interesting 
to see whether there is a way to quantify the magnitude of this efficiency loss. 
Such a quantification seems to me to be an important element in any evaluation 
of the system. (Of course, if one believes that there is inherent market failure 
in the banking sector, and less access to loans by firms outside the large busi- 
ness groups is a consequence, then there will be certain efficiency gains in the 
PTB system resulting from correcting the market failure. This can offset the 
efficiency loss associated with the administrative credit crunch. I see no con- 
vincing argument for the existence of market failure. Hence, the effect of the 
PTB system is probably negative on pure efficiency grounds.) 
My second comment is on Nam’s reform proposal. Nam says that the Japa- 
nese main bank  system, despite  its many  problems,  is a model for Korea’s 
banking sector. I do not necessarily  disagree with this. But I think that more 
careful justification may be needed. Broadly speaking, there are two models of 
bank-business relationships in capitalist economies. One is the Anglo-Saxon 
system, in which the stock market plays a significant role in corporate gover- 
nance. Shareholder meetings as well as the possibility of takeovers injects dis- 
cipline into the management of publicly listed firms. Banks, for the most part, 
act more as passive fund providers than as active monitors of firms’ manage- 
ment. The alternative model is the so-called German-Japanese model, in which 
banks play an active role in monitoring, managing, and strategic planning or 
other operations of the firms. (There may be other variants of the two models, 
or a mixture of these features with others. For example, McKinnon might sug- 
gest a third category, say the Taiwanese model, in which the informal financial 
market is large in magnitude. For our discussion, we focus on the dichotomy 
of relative roles of banks vs. equity markets in corporate governance.) 
I am not aware of  any conclusive evidence favoring one particular system 
over the alternative in the long run. This is probably a result of my ignorance 
of the relevant literature. But it seems that each system has its advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, Nam has argued that one advantage of the Japa- 
nese model is that it may reduce information and agency costs between banks 
and firms. But at the same time, the Japanese model can also raise agency costs 
between banks and depositors. As a bank’s involvement with a firm is more 
than proportional  to its loans, there is also greater scope for moral  hazard. 
Contrary to depositors’ interests, banks may extend loans to a firm that should 
be liquidated. 
From a global and historical  perspective, there are successful economies 
with either financial model. Indeed, there is a bit of  mutual convergence be- 
tween the two systems. Financial reforms in Japan have given impetus to the 
development  of  its  capital  market,  making  it  several  notches  closer to the 
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ing sector in the United  States is making it more like the German-Japanese 
financial system. To summarize, it appears that either model can be compatible 
with the successful development of a market economy. 
If the long-run economic effects of the two model systems are comparable, 
is there any short-run reason to favor one model over the other? There may be 
two reasons for an affirmative answer. First of all, there is substantial initial 
cost to the development of a capital market. Given the small size of the equity 
market, the closer bank-firm relations within the main bank system are desir- 
able because they at least provide some external discipline  to firm manage- 
ment. The second reason is of the hysteresis type. Given that Korea already 
has a PTB  system, it may be more efficient  and less costly to reform  it to a 
main bank system than to dismantle it and foster a parallel capital market. The 
question  is whether  these benefits  are large enough to overcome the moral 
hazard problem associated with closer bank-firm relationships. My position is 
not that a PTB or main bank system is undesirable for Korea, but that more 
explicit  investigation  might  be  useful  before  proposing  a  particular  bank- 
business relationship. 